It is widely accepted that a requirement for honest handicap signalling is that higher-quality signallers pay lower marginal costs for advertising. This is a simple, powerful principle, but it is correct only if the fitness effects of fecundity and viability are strictly additive. Additivity would not be expected from most life history models. The general criterion for honest handicap signalling is that higher-quality signallers must have higher marginal fitness effects of advertising. This might result from higher benefits rather than lower costs. The general criterion implies the existence of a ridge on the fitness surface for two correlated characters, quality (or viability) and advertising. This has important implications for the design of experiments. Critical tests of the handicap hypothesis should establish that signallers of different quality are on a rising fitness ridge because of different cost-benefit trade-offs. The further question of whether receivers are maximizing their fitness requires additional experiments because handicap signalling does not require that the receivers maximize their fitness, only that they return benefits to signallers as an increasing function of the size of the signal. If receiver preferences are exaggerated by sensory bias or indirect selection, the resulting exaggerated signals may be consistent with the handicap principle.
Honest signalling is a kind of cooperation. It begs for an explanation that is ultimately selfish (Dawkins & Krebs 1978; Krebs & Dawkins 1984) . The possibilities include common interests, genetic correlations and various kinds of trade-offs. This paper focuses on one particular tradeoff constraint, the handicap principle (e.g. Zahavi 1975 Zahavi , 1977 Andersson 1994; Møller 1995) . Zahavi's insight that costs are necessary to confer credibility to signals is fundamental to economic theories of signalling and bargaining (Spence 1974; Kennan & Wilson 1993; Farrell & Rabin 1996; Zahavi 1997) . Honest signalling results when it is in the selfish interest of lower-quality signallers to balance the cost-benefit trade-off at lower levels of signalling, maintaining a positive correlation across signallers between advertising and the quality of delivered goods. van Noordwijk & de Jong (1986; Stearns 1992) used the same idea to explain why positive correlations exist between life history traits, like fecundity and viability, across individuals of different quality, even though there are negative trade-offs within each individual. Handicap signalling is a special case of selection on correlated characters (Price et al. 1993; Gustafsson et al. 1995; Kirkpatrick 1996; Sheldon 1996) .
The handicap principle seems to rest on reasonably firm theoretical and empirical ground (Andersson 1994; Johnstone 1995; Møller 1995) . Under certain conditions, honesty is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in a signalling game between senders and receivers (Grafen 1990) . Unfortunately, the necessary conditions for honest handicap signalling are widely misunderstood. Although costs are necessary for reliable signalling (Zahavi 1997), differential costs are neither necessary nor sufficient to explain reliability. The goals of this paper are to (1) re-derive the necessary conditions for handicap signalling in a more general life-history context and (2) interpret the results so that they serve as a better guide to the design of critical empirical tests.
COSTS AND BENEFITS
When signalling involves male advertising and female mate choice, the critical cost-benefit trade-off for males is between viability costs and mating or fecundity benefits (Nur & Hasson 1984) . Viability (V(q,a)) is assumed to depend on signaller quality q, as well as advertising intensity a. Fecundity benefits (P(a)) depend on advertising but not quality (quality is asymmetric private information; Kennan & Wilson 1993) . Fitness w can be represented with viability and fecundity explicit (w=W(V(q,a), P(a))) or implicit (w=W(q,a)). For strategic handicap signalling to work as an ESS, it must be the case that 'better males do better by advertising more' (Grafen 1990, page 520). Grafen inferred from this that if certain
